THE LIKELY LEGACIES OF TADIC
Jose E. Alvarez *
How will historians and others judge the Balkan war crimes
tribunal? In my brief time, I would like to indicate how the prosecution of
Tadic, the first case before that tribunal, has raised some doubts about that
body's legitimacy and likely legacy.
It is clear the creators of this tribunal attempted to correct some of
the obvious problems with Nuremberg and Tokyo. The legitimacy of
those earlier prosecutions had been attacked on a number of grounds:
1) as revenge trials subject to double standards wrought and conducted
by the victors against the vanquished;
2)

for violating the rights of defendants through such questionable
practices as trials in absentia and unfair evidentiary rules that
subjected defendants to trial by document subject to no appeal or
review with little attempt to equalize the opportunities between
prosecution and defense;

3)

for violating the rule against ex post facto imposition of criminal
liability, principally through charges invoking crimes against
aggression, crimes against humanity, and for membership in criminal
organizations;

4)

for dishonoring the memory of Holocaust victims by artificially
limiting all prosecutions to crimes committed in the course of
aggressive war by one state against another thereby denying victims
of German atrocities, particularly against the Jews and gypsies, from
presenting the world with an accurate picture of the nature of the
Holocaust (both during the War and before) and the very real
complicity of ordinary German citizens.'
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The creators of the Balkan tribunal sought valiantly to anticipate
and correct these possible problems. Thus, they created an institution that
they believed would not be subject to the charge of victor's justice since
the tribunal was created by the world community in the form of the United
Nations Security Council and not merely through the action of incidental
victors of a war. They sought to ensure that the tribunal's judges would
reflect the world's diversity and not merely the interests of the five
permanent members of the Council. They further attempted to defuse
accusations of partiality by giving the tribunal jurisdiction over all crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia by any side They incorporated the
guarantees of modern international human rights to ensure fairness to
defendants and gave solace to victims by providing mechanisms in the
tribunal's procedures to protect them from harm should they testify. In
response to fears of ex post facto law, they restricted the tribunal's
jurisdiction to crimes based on those "rules of beyond any doubt part of
customary law."'2 With an eye on the ultimate legitimacy of the tribunal,
they omitted the death penalty, trials in absentia, or liability for mere
membership in a criminal organization.,
Despite all these ostensible improvements vis-A-vis Nuremberg and
Tokyo, the legitimacy of the tribunal remains an issue. The most obvious
set of constraints for the Tribunal has been ably suggested by others and I
need not dwell on them in my remarks. There are grave doubts about the
likely efficacy of the tribunal's efforts given the unstable nature of the
former Yugoslavia itself, and most significantly, the fact that many of
those responsible for heinous crimes remain at large and some in positions
of considerable influence and power. Whatever else might be said about
Nuremberg and Tokyo, those proceedings at least succeeded in convicting
some of high official and not merely small fry like Tadic. Critics charge
that by comparison, the enormity of crimes that are likely to remain
unaddressed in the former Yugoslavia mocks justice and that the tribunal's
efforts are likely to be as ludicrous as an effort to conduct Nazi war crimes
4
prosecutions would have been in the absence of D-Day.
Less obvious legitimization issues have become clearer as a result
of the Tribunal's responses' to pre-trial motions filed in the Tadic case. In
an unsuccessful attempt to resist trial, Tadic argued that the tribunal was
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illegal because the United Nations drafters had not envisaged it; because
the United Nations General Assembly was not involved in the tribunal's
creation; because the text of the United Nations Charter did not grant the
United Nations Security Council authority to create such a judicial organ;
because the Council had not consistently created such tribunals in other
instances; because the Council could not act on individuals; because there
had been no real threat to the peace; and because the Council could not
displace national courts and therefore had illegally violated national
sovereignty. It surprised no one that both the trial and appellate chambers
of the tribunal dismissed all of Tadic's arguments and upheld the legality
of the tribunal X indeed a cynic would say that judges had little choice but
to uphold the legality of the enterprise of which they were such an
important part. Nonetheless, the judges' responses demonstrated how
difficult it is to legitimize this tribunal given through traditionally
legalistic, as opposed to policy-driven, arguments.
The trial and appellate chamber's diverse responses to Tadic's
contentions show that novel issues of United Nations Charter
interpretation, including contestable propositions about the reviewability of
Security Council decisions, are posed by the tribunal's creation and
continued operation.
From the perspective of an academic, Tadic's arguments put the
tribunal's judges between a rock and a hard place. In order to justify the
legality of their tribunal, Tadic's judges found that they either had to
modestly defer from Tadic's questions in deference to an non-reviewable
Security Council or boldly proclaim review authority over the Security
Council while affirming in substance all that the Council had done. The
trial chamber in its response of August 10, 1995, took the first tack while
the appellate chamber took the second in its opinion issued on October 2,
1995.
Neither response is likely to be entirely acceptable to both
permanent and non-permanent members of the United Nations and the
chambers' opinions are provoke further debate about the viability and
wisdom of the ad hoc war crimes tribunals.
The weakest set of responses to Tadic's arguments came from the
trial chamber. In an opinion signed by Judge Gabrielle MacDonald of the
United States, that chamber attempted to put off these issues by relying on
the political question doctrine imported from U.S. constitutional law.,
Essentially, the trial judges demurred on Tadic's substantive arguments on
the grounds that the Security Council is all-powerful and non-reviewable.
Although the heart of a criminal trial such as Tadic is the need to resolve
5. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Balkans war Cr. Trib. (Aug. 10, 1995) (hereinafter
"trial chamber"), in particular paras. 6,23-24.
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the rights of individuals X both Tadic's and the rights of his alleged
victims the trial judges opted to privilege state power embodied in the
Security Council over the human rights integral to the tribunal's enterprise.
In suggesting the Council had done presented a non-reviewable political
question, the trial chamber came very close to suggesting that the judges
need to follow the Council's dictates, even if this were to violate
defendants (or victim's) human rights or even if the Council were to
mandate selective enforcement of international humanitarian law. In
deference to the likely reaction this conclusion was likely to provoke (and
not just among human rights lawyers), the trial chamber straddled a
number of inconsistent propositions to the satisfaction of no one. Thus,
for example, while the tribunal affirmed that individuals gain human rights
under applicable law, including the individual right to be tried by courts
established by law, it also simultaneously tried to affirm that individuals
have no standing to assert these rights because states generally and the
Council in particular have said otherwise.
The most withering critique of the trial chamber's approach came
from the tribunal itself, namely the appellate chamber. As the majority of
the appellate judges pointed out, the trial chamber's answers to Tadic are
inconsistent with international law principles granting all international
adjudicative bodies competence de la competence - that is, the power and
the duty to determine the legality of its own jurisdiction.6 The majority of
the appellate judges wisely decided that refusing to answer Tadic's
questions by relying a variant of the political questions doctrine would not
be a credit to the tribunal. They wisely decided in a case in which the
freedom of an individual was at stake, the tribunal's own judges needed to
defend why this tribunal was as legitimate a body to render such a decision
as any national court. The appellate chamber decided that it could ill
afford to avoid an opportunity to justify their tribunal's existence.
But while the majority of the appellate judges attempted to give
more substantive answers to Tadic's challenges, the implications of their
answers are likely to be contested by many United Nations members as
well as the human rights community. Among the contestable conclusions
of the majority of the appellate judges were the following:
1)

That notwithstanding Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
sitting judges like themselves were empowered to pronounce on the
legality of Security Council action a conclusion that permanent

6. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Balkens war Cr. Trib. (Oct. 2, 1995)
(hereinafter appellate Chamber), in particular paras. 11-12,14, and 18.
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members of the Council are not likely to find altogether comforting
and one that the World Court itself has to date resisted;
2)

That (at odds with one above) the validity of Council action can be
presumed, even when not supported by either the text of the Charter
or its negotiating history, particularly if supported by the Council's
prior practice a conclusion that neither nonpermanent members nor
some segments of the human rights community concerned by recent
Council actions (as with respect to the conduct of the Gulf War) are
likely to altogether favor;

3)

That the Security Council can delegate its functions to another body
(even one that is not subject to the veto), can act prosecutions
conclusions that are as likely to prompt discomfort in permanent as
well as non-permanent United Nations members and even more so in
the human rights community;

4)

That "it is only for want of resources that the United Nations has to
act through its Members" 7 a recipe for institutional override over any
and all sovereign rights that would have surprised the original drafters
of the limited security regime which is the United Nations Charter;

5)

That internal armed conflicts may constitute threats to the
international peace notwithstanding the language of article 2(4)
banning only inter-state force another conclusion that is not likely to
win the hearts and minds of any state with unruly internal disputes
who naively believes that such matters are within their protected
domestic jurisdiction and is not subject to forceful Council
intervention;

6)

That criminal defendant's rights to be tried before courts established
by law merely means a right to be tried by any court that respects a
defendant's other procedural rights - a result at odds with the
position of human rights advocates before other tribunals. As a result
of the Tadic case, defenders of the tribunal may now find it necessary
to defend contestable readings of the United Nations Charter and the
powers of the Security Council which go to the heart of post-Cold
War debates about that body's newly flexed muscles. Today, the
United Nations finds itself in a quandary with respect to legitimacy
and future direction of the Security Council.
7.

Id. at 36.
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Increasingly, non-permanent members question the representative
nature of that body as well as the scope of many of its post-Cold War
precedents. As is clear from recent opinions of the World Court as well as
scholarly debates, many United Nations members resist giving that body
unchecked authority as much as permanent veto-wielding states such as the
United States resist any suggestion that what the Security Council does is
ultimately reviewable by any court even one that the Council itself has
created.8 The appellate body's response to Tadic's pre-trial motions
manages to offend all sides in this debate without settling the underlying
issues.
Of more immediate concern to litigants in the Balkan tribunal is
that the appellate body's response to Tadic does not answer important
questions concerning the future relationship between that tribunal and the
Security Council. While the tribunal is, of course, financially dependent
on the Council, as well as on the generosity of particular United Nations
members, it remains unclear the extent to which the rights of defendants
and victims remain legally subservient to the demands of the Council or
even to the General Assembly. Could those political bodies interfere with
on-going trials or investigations? Does the Security Council retain the
authority to, for example, instruct the tribunal not to try prominent Serbs
because of the supposed threat to the peace process or to the reconciliation
of the country? Could the Council direct a United States national court not
to pursue the on-going civil case against Karadzic?9 If Security Council or
General Assembly override remains a possibility, what does that possibility
never mind its exercise mean for the fulfillment of the tribunal's grand
goals, especially its claim to be non-partial and devoted to the equal
application of established law?
These are not the only difficult issues that have been presented by
this initial prosecution. In response to Tadic, the tribunal has also
determined that charges can be brought against Tadic even for acts
committed in the course of an internal conflict. The judges specifically
found that the nexus required at Nuremberg between crimes against peace
and crimes against humanity is no longer required by modem international
law.'0 Because of the nature of the Balkan conflict, the tribunal has seen fit
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to go beyond the Nuremberg precedents, thereby raising some doubts
about the application of ex post facto law."
Finally, the trial court's answer to at least one pre-trial motion by
the prosecutor in the Tadic reveals one likely point of contention with
respect to the perceived fairness of the tribunal's procedures. The trial
chamber ruled that the prosecutor is free to present defense witnesses
without identifying these to either Tadic or his defense counsel.' 2 While
the prosecutor has decided not to take advantage of this ruling during
Tadic's trial, the possibility that she may resort to unidentified witnesses in
other cases involving, for example, charges of mass rape is likely to
prompt a barrage of criticism by many common law lawyers to whom
cross-examination is sacred. Indeed, one prominent U.S. lawyer, a former
legal adviser to the State Department, has argued that if this were to occur,
he would support amendment of the United Nations Charter to add a bill of
rights." On the other hand, should the prosecutor respond to such fears by
dropping charges of mass rape against other defendants, she is apt to be
criticized for ignoring one crucial aspect of ethnic cleansing as practiced in
the former Yugoslavia: its brutally gendered nature. Indeed, if future
trials fail to deal with the rape charges because of the difficult evidentiary
issues, historians are likely to say that this tribunal sanitized ethnic
cleansing as much as Nuremberg did the Holocaust. Those who have been
raped in order to cleanse parts of the former Yugoslavia will not forgive
this tribunal if it ignores their stories or if it fails to condemn the guilty for
this particular crime. For many, a failure to acknowledge this aspect of
ethnic cleansing would betray one of the tribunal's principal goals: an
accurate rendering.
Some of the doubts about the legitimacy of this tribunal emerge
because its composition is as cosmopolitan as it is. Some of the doubts
arise because of the judges' differing answers to the pre-trial motions made
in the Tadic case.
Even those most concerned with the tribunal's
legitimacy its judges individually differ on such basic questions as the
reviewability of Security Council decisions, the nature of the underlying
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conflict in the Balkans, the extent to which internal conflicts can be said to
trigger threat to the peace, and the need to resort to unidentified witnesses.
Yet, as the dissent of Judge Pal in the Tokyo trials" should remind us,
some degree of judicial unanimity between east and west, north and south
may be necessary if this international tribunal is to retain (or acquire) true
international legitimacy. The Tadic case shows that we have not yet
reached closure with respect to fundamental jurisprudential issues about
this tribunal. Instead, one gets the strong sense that, at least with respect
to some basic issues, Tadic's judges simply turned to circular arguments
such as their all-purpose answer that the legality of the tribunal needs to be
affirmed because "the very purpose of the creation of an international
criminal jurisdiction" would otherwise be defeated."5
Such arguments, though grounded in political necessity, encourage
a search for alternatives to ad hoc war crimes tribunals created on the
mere whim of the Security Council. The proceedings in Tadic have not
stemmed a growing skepticism that, despite the stenuous efforts of its
drafters, the Balkan tribunal has not (yet) overcome the flawed legacy of
Nuremberg.
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